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SUPREME COURT WATCH
RECENT DECISIONS OF SELECTED CRIMINAL CASES | BY MICHAEL YELLOTT
ABBOTT V. UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 09-479
Decided: November 15, 2010
Question Presented:
What is the proper interpretation and application of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(I)(A)’s “except” clause for mandatory mini-
mum sentences involving drug trafficking and gun crimes?
Facts:
Petitioners Abbott and Gould were charged in unrelated 
prosecutions with drug and firearm violations of 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c), which prohibits using, carrying, or possessing a deadly 
weapon in connection with any drug trafficking or violent 
crime. They were convicted and each sentenced to an additional 
five years under this section.
Both Abbott and Gould claimed they could not be sen-
tenced to any additional prison time due to the “except” clause 
in §924(c)(1)(A), which states that a minimum term of five 
years shall be imposed “except to the extent that a greater mini-
mum sentence is otherwise provided by [this section] or by any 
other provision of law.”
Both claimed that this clause was triggered by other penal-
ties arising out of other felonies. Gould argued that any greater 
minimum sentence on a different count of conviction would suf-
fice to trigger the except clause, while Abbott argued a “transac-
tional approach” (so long as the sentence triggering the except 
clause was part of the same criminal transaction that triggered 
§924(c) in the first place). The arguments were rejected by the 
Fifth and Third Circuit Courts, respectively. Both appealed and 
the cases were consolidated.
Decision:
In a unanimous opinion (Justice Kagan took no part in the 
opinion, recusing herself) written by Justice Ginsburg, the Court 
affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, holding that the “except” 
clause only applies when a greater minimum sentence is other-
wise provided for §924(c) offenses. While the only other stat-
ute besides §924(c) that falls within this exception is §3559(c), 
future statutes could fall within the exception if it covers the 
same conduct. It does not apply broadly to any other offense a 
defendant commits.
The Court refers to the legislative intent of adding the “ex-
cept” clause, which was not part of the statute as originally en-
acted. Congress added the language as part of reforms to stiffen 
penalties for gun and drug-related offenses, therefore it is un-
likely the clause was added to act as an escape mechanism for 
any defendant charged and convicted of any other crime carry-
ing more than a five-year penalty.
Moreover, the language referencing greater minimums 
provided by “any other provision of law” was simply a way 
for Congress to direct sentencing judges not to “stack” punish-
ments (for example, punishing for possessing, brandishing, and 
discharging a weapon separately even though it was all part of 
the same transaction).
GRANTED CERTIORARI: 
BELLEQUE v. MOORE; 
PREMO v. MOORE
Docket Number: 09-658
Argued: October 12, 2010
Questions Presented:
1) Does the standard in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
279 (1991), commanding a court to “exercise extreme caution” 
before determining that a failure to move to suppress a coerced 
confession was nonprejudicial, apply in this case because no 
record of trial is available for review?
2) Is the standard set forth in Arizona v. Fulminante clearly 
established federal law?
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3) Did the Ninth Circuit err in granting a petition for federal 
habeas corpus relief because petitioner confessed to two people 
and offered no evidence that had his trial counsel suppressed his 
confession he would have insisted on going to trial?
Facts:
Randy Moore pleaded no-contest to felony murder in an 
Oregon trial court and was sentenced to twenty-five years im-
prisonment. After exhausting all post-conviction state court 
remedies, Mr. Moore petitioned for habeas corpus relief in an 
Oregon federal district court, arguing that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to recognize that his taped confession 
was obtained unconstitutionally. The district court denied the 
petition.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed and granted the petition. The court held that counsel’s 
failure to suppress the confession was both constitutionally de-
ficient and prejudicial under the standard set forth in Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The court noted that even 
the state conceded that police ignored Mr. Moore’s request for 
counsel and, therefore, the means by which the state elicited Mr. 
Moore’s confession were unconstitutional.
BOND V. UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 09-1227
Granted Cert: October 12, 2010
Question Presented:
Whether a criminal defendant convicted under a federal 
statute has standing to challenge her conviction on grounds that, 
as applied in this case, the statute is beyond the federal gov-
ernment’s enumerated powers and inconsistent with the Tenth 
Amendment.
Facts:
Carol Bond was found guilty of trying to poison her hus-
band’s mistress with toxic chemicals multiple times over the 
course of several months.
Bond stole the chemical potassium dichromate from the 
company where she was employed as a lab technician. Haynes 
had contacted police and postal authorities after finding the 
chemicals at her home. Haynes was not injured from any of 
Ms. Bond’s 24 attempts to poison her.
A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
charged Bond with two counts of possessing and using a chemi-
cal weapon in violation of a criminal statute implementing the 
treaty obligations of the United States under the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention, in addition to two counts of mail theft.
Bond’s attorneys argue that the statute was intended to deal 
with “rogue states” and terrorists and that their client should 
have been prosecuted under state law instead.
In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held that Bond lacked standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the statute on the basis of the Tenth Amendment.
CONNICK V. THOMPSON
Docket Number: 09-571
Argued: October 6, 2010
Question Presented:
1) Does imposing failure-to-train liability on a district at-
torney’s office for a single Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violation 
contravene the rigorous culpability and causation standards of 
Canton, 489 U.S. 658 (1978), and Bryan County, 520 U.S. 397 
(1997)?
2) Does imposing failure-to-train liability on a district at-
torney’s office for a single Brady violation undermine prosecu-
tors’ absolute immunity, which was recognized in Van de Kamp 
v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009)?
Facts:
Prosecutors in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office 
hid exculpatory evidence, violating John Thompson’s rights 
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Despite no his-
tory of similar violations, the office was found liable under § 
1983 for failing to train prosecutors.
A pattern of violations is usually necessary to show culpa-
bility and causation, but in exceptional cases one violation may 
suffice. Bryan County, 520 U.S., at 409.  However, 
the Court has to-date hypothesized only one example justifying 
single-incident liability: a failure to train police officers on the 
use of deadly force. See Canton, 489 U.S., at 390 n.10.
DAVIS V. UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 09-11328
Granted Cert: November 1, 2010
Question Presented:
Whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
applies to a search that was authorized by precedent at the time 
of the search but is then subsequently ruled unconstitutional.
Facts:
Police arrested Mr. Davis after a traffic stop. The officers 
asked Davis his name, to which he responded with a false name. 
After discovering his correct name the officers arrested him, 
B$8B&/%LQGG $0
68 Fall 2010
handcuffed him and put him in the police car for giving false 
information to a police officer. They then searched the vehicle 
and found a gun in his jacket. He was charged and convicted for 
possession of an illegal weapon.
Following a jury trial, Davis was convicted and sentenced 
to 220 months in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit found that, while the search was in fact illegal, 
the evidence found in the vehicle was still admissible because 
the officers believed in good faith that it was permissible to 
search the car.
DEPIERRE V. UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 09-1533
Granted Cert: October 10, 2010
Question Presented:
Whether the term “cocaine base” includes every form of 
cocaine that is classified chemically as a base or is the term 
limited to “crack” cocaine.
Facts:
In April of 2008, a jury found Mr. DePierre guilty of dis-
tributing cocaine. He was also found guilty of distributing more 
than 50 grams of cocaine base, carrying a 10-year minimum 
sentence. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison, followed by 
five years of supervised release.
In March of 2010, the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the sentence, citing its past precedent. The opinion also 
notes that the 2d, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 10th Circuits (but not all 
Circuits) interpret the statute the same way.
Due to the circuit split on the interpretation of “cocaine 
base,” the Supreme Court needs to resolve the discrepancy and 
has agreed to hear the case.
FOWLER V. UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 10-5443
Granted Cert: November 15, 2010
Question Presented:
What kind of proof must prosecutors offer to obtain a con-
viction for murdering a person with intent to prevent him from 
communicating information about a federal offense?
Facts:
Mr. Fowler shot and killed Mr. Horner for trying to inter-
fere with his plan to rob a bank with four other men. Horner 
had approached Fowler’s accomplices as they sat in a stolen 
car, wearing black clothes and gloves. Fowler, who had stepped 
out of the car, snuck up behind Horner, grabbed his gun, forced 
him to get on his knees and shot him in the back of the head, 
killing him.
One of Fowler’s accomplices later implicated him in the 
murder, and a jury convicted Fowler of killing Horner with the 
intent to prevent him from communicating information about 
a federal offense. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus 10 
years.
Fowler argues the government failed to prove that a federal 
investigation would have been probable, and that Horner was 
likely to have transferred the information to a federal officer 
or judge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the lower court ruling.
HARRINGTON V. RICHTER
Docket Number: 09-587
Argued: October 12, 2010
Question Presented:
1) Whether the Ninth Circuit impermissibly enlarged the 
Sixth Amendment’s right to effective counsel by elevating the 
value of expert testimony to virtually always require defense 
counsel to produce such testimony.
2) Does the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty def-
erence apply to a state court’s summary disposition of a claim, 
including a claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984)?
Facts:
A California trial court convicted Mr. Richter of murder 
and burglary. After he exhausted his state court remedies, he 
filed for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district 
court. Mr. Richter argued that he was denied effective assis-
tance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment by fail-
ing to introduce expert testimony. The district court denied the 
petition and was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.
However, upon rehearing the Ninth Circuit granted the 
petition, holding that the state court’s determination that Mr. 
Richter was not denied effective assistance of counsel was un-
reasonable. The court reasoned that under Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the defendant must show that 
“counsel’s performance was deficient.” The defendant must 
also show that “the deficient performance prejudiced the de-
fense.” Both of these requirements of Strickland were met, the 
Ninth Circuit concludes, when Mr. Richter’s counsel failed 
to conduct pre-trial investigations to determine what forensic 
evidence or experts would be useful in countering the prosecu-
tion’s foreseeable evidence.
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J.D.B. V. NORTH CAROLINA
Docket Number: 09-11121
Granted Cert: November 1, 2010
Question Presented:
Whether a court may consider a juvenile’s age in a Miranda 
custody analysis when evaluating the totality of the circumstances 
and determining whether a reasonable person in the accused’s 
position would have felt he was not free to terminate police ques-
tioning and leave?
Facts:
J.D.B., a seventh-grade student in Chapel Hill, N.C., was 
taken from a special education class and questioned by a police 
investigator and the assistant principal about a series of burglaries 
in the area after the police had learned that J.D.B. was in posses-
sion of an item that had been reported stolen.
J.D.B. was escorted to a private school conference room, 
where he was interrogated by the juvenile crimes investigator in 
the presence of several school officials, but not his parents. The 
student’s parents were not contacted and he was not read his Mi-
randa rights at any time during the interrogation.
After being confronted with the evidence and with a school 
official urging him to “do the right thing,” J.D.B. confessed to 
the burglaries and wrote a statement to that effect. The police 
then obtained a search warrant and recovered the stolen items at 
J.D.B.’s home .
Counsel for J.D.B. sought to suppress his confession in a 
juvenile-delinquency proceeding charging him with two counts 
each of breaking and entering and larceny, but J.D.B. lost in lower 
courts and before the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The state’s highest court rejected J.D.B.’s claim that he was 
in custody during the school interrogation and should have been 
given a Miranda warning. The court said it could not consider the 
boy’s age or special education status in determining whether he 




Argued: October 5, 2010
Question Presented:
Are inquiries of wounded victims considered non-testimonial 
when they objectively indicate that the purpose of the questioning 
is to enable police to meet an immediate and ongoing emergency, 
and, thus, are not afforded heightened protection under Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)?
Facts:
A Michigan trial court convicted Mr. Bryant of second de-
gree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and pos-
session of a firearm during commission of a felony. On appeal, 
Mr. Bryant challenged the admission of the victim’s statements 
at trial for violating his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. 
The victim stated that Mr. Bryant shot him, but died shortly there-
after, thus was unavailable for cross-examination by Mr. Bryant’s 
counsel.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The 
Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements 
that the victim made to police before his death were testimonial 
and their admission violated Mr. Bryant’s right to confrontation. 
The court reasoned that the victim’s statements were made in the 
course of a police interrogation whose primary purpose was to 
establish or prove events that had already occurred, not to enable 
police to meet an immediate and ongoing emergency. Therefore, 
the statements were “testimonial” for the purposes of the height-
ened protections afforded in Crawford v. Washington and should 
not have been admitted against Mr. Bryant at trial.
TOLENTINO V. NEW YORK
Docket Number: 10-11556
Granted Cert: November 15, 2010
Question Presented:
Can an individual’s motor vehicle records be used as evi-
dence against him when the police consulted those records only 
after making an illegal stop of the individual’s vehicle?
Facts:
Jose Tolentino was pulled over for playing his music too 
loudly. The officer ran Tolentino’s DMV files and discovered 
that not only was his license currently suspended, but it had also 
been suspended at least 10 times prior. Tolentino was arrested 
and charged with first-degree aggravated unlicensed operation 
of a motor vehicle. He pleaded guilty in exchange for five years’ 
probation.
He later appealed, arguing his driving record should have 
been suppressed because the police stop and subsequent DMV 
record search were illegal. The Court of Appeals of New York 
disagreed and upheld his sentence.
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